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INTRODUCTION
The private and public sectors have been experiencing devastating
cybersecurity incidents for at least two decades now.1 Sony,2 Yahoo!,3 Equifax,4

*
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author wishes to thank Jeff Kosseff for his valuable feedback on this piece.
1
See, e.g., Taylor Armerding, The 18 Biggest Data Breaches of the 21st Century, CSO ONLINE (Dec.
20, 2018), https://www.csoonline.com/article/2130877/the-biggest-data-breaches-of-the-21st-century.
html/.
2
Andrea Peterson, The Sony Pictures Hack, Explained, WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 2014)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/12/18/the-sony-pictures-hack-explained/,
(“Hackers broke into the computer systems of Sony Pictures entertainment in October. The attackers stole
huge swaths of confidential documents from the Hollywood studio and posted them online in the
following weeks . . . . Multiple reports suggest U.S. government officials believe the attack is tied to the
North Korean government, who expressed outrage over the Sony-backed film ‘The Interview,’ an actioncomedy centered on an assassination plot against North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.”).
3
Nicole Perlroth, All 3 Billion Yahoo Accounts Were Affected by 2013 Attack, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/03/technology/yahoo-hack-3-billion-users.html, (“Digital
thieves made off with names, birth dates, phone numbers and passwords of users that were encrypted
with security that was easy to crack . . . investigators believe the attackers behind the 2013 breach were
Russian and possibly linked to the Russian government.”).
4
Kate Fazzini, The Great Equifax Mystery: 17 Months Later, the Stolen Data Has Never Been Found,
and Experts Are Starting to Suspect a Spy Scheme, CNBC (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.cnbc.
com/2019/02/13/equifax-mystery-where-is-the-data.html, (“In a brazen cyberattack, somebody had
stolen sensitive personal information from more than 140 million people, nearly half the population of
the U.S. . . . Most experts familiar with the case now believe that the thieves were working for a foreign
government and are using the information not for financial gain, but to try to identify and recruit spies.”).
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the Democratic National Committee (DNC),5 Office of Personnel Management,6
and many others represent the share of intrusion victims originating from abroad.
Sony, for example, became the target of a data breach that allegedly originated
in North Korea, protesting the release of The Interview—a comedy movie
depicting the assassination of Kim Jong-un.7 Similarly, the DNC experienced a
cybersecurity incident when Russian hackers, affiliated with the Kremlin, gained
unauthorized access to controversial e-mails that led to political turmoil in the
U.S., allegedly swaying the public opinion and affecting the outcome of the 2016
presidential election.8
Given the international nature of most of these incidents—originating from
abroad and allegedly orchestrated by a state actor—recourse to international law
ought to be intuitive.9 After all, international law is the body of law regulating
and shaping acceptable behavior among nations.
However, as this Article will demonstrate, general international law suffers
from a few fatal flaws that make it a less-than-perfect candidate to stymie the
consequences of offensive cyberspace behavior, particularly as it victimizes
private sector entities and individuals.10
While international law is seemingly ineffective in deterring or regulating
transnational offensive cyberspace behavior, this Article will propose an
alternative that is centered around protecting the individual from foreign
cyberattacks through the application of international human rights law across
borders, as well as its development to meet today’s global cybersecurity
threats.11 Thus far, the majority of scholarship on transnational cyber operations
has focused on the victim state’s rights, such as sovereignty and territorial
inviolability to delegitimize these operations.12 Yet, debates on the precise

5
Ellen Nakashima & Shane Harris, How the Russians Hacked the DNC and Passed its Emails to
Wikileaks, WASH. POST (July 13, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/howthe-russians-hacked-the-dnc-and-passed-its-emails-to-wikileaks/2018/07/13/af19a828-86c3-11e8-8553a3ce89036c78_story.html.
6
Devlin Barrett, Chinese National Arrested for Allegedly Using Malware Linked To OPM Hack,
WASH. POST (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/chinesenational-arrested-for-using-malware-linked-to-opm-hack/2017/08/24/746cbdc2-8931-11e7-a50fe0d4e6ec070a_story.html. (“Court papers filed against Yu Pingan do not mention the OPM, but they do
suggest a connection between the two. The OPM hack is considered one of the worst-ever computer
breaches of U.S. government computer systems because the hackers were able to access a huge volume
of information from security clearance forms filed by federal workers and contractors.”).
7
Peterson, supra note 2.
8
SPECIAL COUNSEL ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN
INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 1 (Mar. 2019), (“The Russian government
interfered in the 2016 presidential election in a sweeping and systematic fashion. Evidence of Russian
government operations began to surface in mid-2016. In June, the Democratic National Committee and
its cyber response team publicly announced that Russian hackers had compromised its computer network.
Releases of hacked materials—hacks that public reporting soon attributed to the Russian government—
began that same month.”).
9
See generally Mary Ellen O’Connell, Cyber Mania, CYBER SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
MEETING SUMMARY (CHATHAM HOUSE, MAY 29, 2012).
10
See Michael Schmitt, Grey Zones in International Law of Cyberspace, 42 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE
1 (2017) (highlighting the gaps and loopholes in international law as applied to cyberspace).
11
See generally Oona Hathaway et al., Human Rights Abroad: When Do Human Rights Treaty
Obligations Apply Extraterritorially?, 43 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 389 (2011).
12
See e.g., Edwin Djabatey, U.S. Offensive Cyber Operations Against Economic Cyber Intrusions:
An International Law Analysis: Part II, JUST SECURITY (July 16, 2019) (arguing that some U.S. offensive
cyber operations against economic cyber intrusions could violate the principle of sovereignty).
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contours of sovereignty, its commonly understood high threshold, reliance on
state’s rights (as opposed to rights of individuals), and the lack of concepts that
fit squarely with the realities of cyberspace, make it an ineffective tool to address
the victimization of private entities.
By focusing on individual, non-state victims, international human rights law
is able to constrain offensive state behavior in cyberspace that interferes with the
rights afforded to these victims—whether the right to privacy, selfdetermination, due process, or freedom of expression or opinion. However, it is
the view of this Article that further development of international human rights
law is required, particularly in the form of a new human right to cybersecurity.
To be clear, whenever international law is mentioned in this Article, it is meant
to the exclusion of international human rights law. While international law
contains a broad variety of discrete bodies of law, international human rights law
differs in significant ways from general international law, as will be further
explored in this Article.
By proposing an extraterritorial application of international human rights
law as a solution, this Article is also mindful of the challenges that such a
proposition entails. For example, while international human rights law is an
established body of law that enjoys near-universal acceptance, states operating
in cyberspace rarely acknowledge the legal and ethical constraints that shape
their activities in that domain.13 Though, even if some states decide to
acknowledge and accept the authority of international human rights law in
cyberspace, a more significant conundrum that remains is whether such states
are under obligation to respect the human rights of foreign individuals located
abroad. Thus, this inquiry is far from hypothetical, as the mere extraterritoriality
of human rights obligations may affect how states use offensive cyber operations
across borders.
Assuming the international community accepts the extraterritorial
application of international human rights law, this may still be insufficient in the
context of cybersecurity. Once extraterritoriality is an established fact, the
content of the human rights themselves may become ambiguous. Surely,
privacy, freedom of expression and opinion, self-determination, and due process
are all valuable rights. But what about the right to access the internet itself, or
the right to cybersecurity (i.e., the protection afforded to individuals against
cyberattacks in general)? As this Article will demonstrate, cybersecurity
concerns may not be entirely alleviated by the existing human rights.
This Article will explore the gaps and ambiguities of international law in
protecting non-state victims, the extraterritoriality of human rights as a solution,
and the difficult challenges that would nonetheless persist. The Article is
structured as follows. In Part I, this Article will look at international law in

13
See Dan Efrony & Yuval Shany, A Rule Book on the Shelf? Tallinn Manual 2.0 on Cyberoperations
and Subsequent State Practice, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. 583, 648 (2018) (arguing that states engaged in
offensive cyberspace operations often “develop a policy of optionality toward the application of
international law . . . a deliberate strategy of treating the applicable international law framework as
optional, in the sense that states may choose whether or not to invoke the legal discourse of international
rights and obligations in their mutual interactions in cyberspace”). Compare these with nations who have
acknowledged the applicability of international law to cyberspace (France, Australia, Estonia, United
Kingdom, Netherlands). See Michael Schmitt, The Netherlands Releases a Tour de Force on
International Law in Cyberspace: Analysis, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 14, 2019).
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general, demonstrating that its basic tenets and assumptions make it
dysfunctional in the global cybersecurity context. In Part II, this Article will
propose an extraterritorial application of international human rights law as a
potential solution to the inadequacy of international law. In Part III, this Article
will assess the primary challenges arising from the application of international
human rights law across borders. Primarily, these challenges surround
territoriality, the content of existing human rights, and the need for a human right
to cybersecurity. This Article will propose ways to overcome these challenges.
Part IV will conclude.
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TRANSNATIONAL CYBERSECURITY INCIDENTS

As cybersecurity becomes a national security concern,14 the resort to
international law appears intuitive. After all, international law does safeguard
certain national security interests that states have. The principles of
sovereignty,15 non-intervention,16 and the prohibition on the threat or use of
force17 are only a few examples where international law accounts for national
security. However, when transposed into cyberspace, these principles and
prohibitions do not fit quite as well. What does sovereignty mean in a domain
that lacks territory? Is election interference through cyberspace a violation of the
principle of non-intervention? At what point does a data breach constitute a use
of force? These are some of the most perplexing questions in the context of
cybersecurity as national security.
A. WHAT IS SOVEREIGNTY ANYWAY?
While many would claim that sovereignty is a cornerstone principle of
international law, the precise contours of such principle are highly contested and
misunderstood.18 The UN Charter for example, provides that “[t]he Organization
[UN] is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.”19

14
See e.g., THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL CYBER STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
11 (2018) (“Computer hacking conducted by transnational criminal groups poses a significant threat to
our national security.”); Gabor Rona & Lauren Aarons, State Responsibility to Respect, Protect and Fulfill
Human Rights Obligations in Cyberspace, 8 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 503, 518 (2016) (quoting
the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression:
“the Internet [may] be abused to interfere with the rights of others, national security, or public order”).
15
See e.g., U.N. Charter art. 2(1) (“The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign
equality of all its Members.”); Samantha Besson, Sovereignty, OXFORD PUB. INT’L L. ¶ 56 (last updated
Apr. 2011) (“In international law, internal sovereignty is used to mean the supreme authority within a
territory or the ultimate power within that territory.”).
16
See e.g., U.N. Charter art. 2(7) (“Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state . . . .”).
17
See U.N. Charter art. 2(4) (“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”).
18
See Jens David Ohlin, Did Russian Cyber Interference in the 2016 Election Violate International
Law?, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1579, 1579 (2017) (“Sovereignty is a funny thing. It is allegedly the foundation
of the Westphalian order, but its exact contours are frustratingly indeterminate.”).
19
U.N. Charter art. 2(1).
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Another widely accepted understanding of sovereignty was articulated by the
Island of Palmas arbitral award in 1928,20 where the panel observed that
sovereignty “signifies independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the
globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the
functions of a State.”21
While sovereignty is based largely on territorial notions, it is not out of the
question that it applies equally to cyberspace. The Tallinn Manual 2.0, a work
of a group of experts at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of
Excellence translating existing international law to cyberspace, proclaimed that
“[t]he principle of State sovereignty applies in cyberspace”22 and that states
“must not conduct cyber operations that violate the sovereignty of another
State.”23
However, the application of sovereignty to cyberspace does not necessarily
lead to any more clarity on the relationship between sovereignty and
cybersecurity. For example, can sovereignty be violated if the target of a
cybersecurity incident is not a state actor, but a private entity? What kinds of
incidents and effects violate sovereignty? Can non-state actors directly violate
sovereignty through cyberspace? This lack of clarity may inadvertently lead to
an over-expansive view of what sovereignty means in cyberspace. Some argue
that “any action occurring within the territory of another State without that
State’s permission”24 would violate the “sovereign inviolability” of that state.
This view would lead to the conclusion that any cybersecurity incident across
borders is suspect of violating international law. In response, victim states could
potentially overuse countermeasures to deter such attacks,25 and increase the risk
of escalation as a result.
At the other end of the spectrum are those who claim that sovereignty is a
primary rule of international law, meaning that it is effectuated and enforced
through secondary rules that are afforded greater granularity.26 According to that
view, sovereignty cannot be seen as a principle that can be violated directly, but
rather as an idea that international law protects through specific norms,
principles, and institutions. For example, the principle of non-intervention is
often seen as the secondary rule through which sovereignty is enforced.

20

Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands, U.S.) 2 R.I.A.A. 829 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928).
Id. at 838.
THE TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS 11
(Michael Schmitt ed.) (“Rule 1”) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL] (emphasis added).
23
Id. at 17 (“Rule 4”) (emphasis added).
24
See Robert Taylor, Cyber, Sovereignty, and North Korea – And the Risk of Inaction, JUST
SECURITY (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/46531/cyber-sovereignty-north-korea-riskinaction/.
25
Michael Schmitt, In Defense of Sovereignty in Cyberspace, JUST SECURITY (May 8, 2018),
https://www.justsecurity.org/55876/defense-sovereignty-cyberspace/ (“Countermeasures are proportionate actions by the ‘injured’ state that would be unlawful but for the fact that they are designed to put an
end to the ‘responsible’ state’s unlawful conduct, in this case a sovereignty violation.”).
26
Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul, Respect for Sovereignty in Cyberspace, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1639,
1650 (2017) (“The question at hand is whether the principle of sovereignty operates as a primary rule of
customary international law, imposing an obligation on States to respect the inviolability of other States’
territories.”).
21
22

40

NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L.

vol. 10:1

B. THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION
International law prohibits external intervention in the domestic and foreign
affairs of another state. While the history of international affairs regarded
intervention as a legitimate tool of influence, international law has gradually
come to delegitimize its use. In the Corfu Channel case, the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) explained that “the alleged right of intervention as the
manifestation of a policy of force, such as has, in the past, given rise to the most
serious abuses and as such cannot, whatever be the present defects in
international organization, find a place in international law.”27 Therefore, the
principle of non-intervention “forbids all States or groups of States to intervene
directly or indirectly in the internal or external affairs of other States.”28 Nonintervention is a fundamental principle of international law—“part and parcel of
customary international law”—and can be found throughout different
instruments of international law, with slight variations.29
But what does non-intervention mean in the context of global cybersecurity
and increasing numbers of state-sponsored cyberattacks? The answer is not
straightforward. Non-intervention, like many other principles of customary
international law, suffers from an absence of authoritative and comprehensive
doctrine, making it immensely difficult to apply to transnational cyber
operations.30 At the heart of the principle is the prerequisite that interference be
“coercive.” Intervention, the International Court of Justice explains, is
“wrongful when it uses methods of coercion.”31 While the Court did not expand
on the notion of coercion, it was understood that intervention is wrongful under
international law when it is “forcible or dictatorial, or otherwise coercive, in
effect depriving the state intervened against of control over the matter in
question.”32
The contours of non-intervention raise some serious limitations on its
applicability to transnational cyber operations. For example, considering the
reciprocal security vulnerability concept, what if the target of an incident is a
prominent private entity, resulting in a national security crisis? The principle
may not apply since no state was deprived of its prerogative in making decisions
on domestic or foreign affairs.
To the degree that a state-sponsored cybersecurity incident results in serious
kinetic effects (deaths, injuries, or damage to physical property) it could be
considered to be in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, prohibiting the

27

Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgement, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, ¶ 35 (Apr. 9).
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgement, 1986
I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 205 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua].
29
Id. at ¶ 202; See Philip Kunig, Intervention, Prohibition of, OXFORD PUB. INT’L L. ¶ 7 (last updated
Apr. 2008), http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1434.
30
See e.g., Ido Kilovaty, Doxfare: Politically Motivated Leaks and the Future of the Norm on NonIntervention in the Era of Weaponized Information, 9 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 146 (2018) (“Generally,
the norm of non-intervention would protect the victim state from physical intrusions by another state
seeking private information.” Conversely, some transnational cyberspace operations “deeply challenge
the traditional understanding of what constitutes wrongful ‘intervention.’”).
31
Nicaragua, supra note 28.
32
1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW: PEACE 432 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 2008).
28
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use of force,33 entitling the victim state to invoke the right to self-defense if the
use of force reaches the level of an armed attack.34 However, since the vast
majority of cybersecurity incidents are non-coercive and non-kinetic, as their
purpose is primarily to access private or secret data, the principle of nonintervention and the prohibition on the use of force may not be relevant.35
Arguably, non-intervention may still be relevant in cybersecurity should
coercion be substituted by another standard.36
C. RECIPROCAL SECURITY VULNERABILITY & OTHER SYSTEMATIC PROBLEMS
Sovereignty, non-intervention, and the prohibition on the use of force may
provide sufficient evidence of the inadequacy of international law in dealing
with the reciprocal security vulnerability problem engulfing most statesponsored cyber operations. However, the idea of “reciprocal security
vulnerability” suggests that there may be some deeper problems with traditional
international law and its ability to address transnational cybersecurity incidents.
Reciprocal security vulnerability, a problem in cybersecurity introduced by
Andrea Matwyshyn, illustrates the vulnerability of both the private and public
sectors to cyberattacks. Critical infrastructure systems “blend private and publicsector elements, simultaneously impacting both national security and consumer
protection concerns,”37 and therefore a clear distinction between the two sectors
is impractical. This blurred line between private and public is not normally a
concept that international law grapples with. For example, the attack on Sony
targeted a private sector actor, however, the impacts on national security and
foreign affairs were substantial.38 The reasons why international law is not
capable of responding to the reciprocal security vulnerability problem are rooted
in its basic structure and defining characteristics, laid out below.
Perhaps the most plausible explanation of why reciprocal security
vulnerability is not on international law’s agenda is because international law is
predominantly concerned with the rights of states, not the private sector. States
are the objects and subjects of international law simultaneously.

33
See U.N. Charter art. 2(4), ¶ 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”).
34
See Nicaragua, supra note 28, at ¶191 (where the ICJ notes that an armed attack is “the most grave
form of the use of force”); See also U.N. Charter art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations.”).
35
See Michael N. Schmitt, “Below the Threshold” Cyber Operations: The Countermeasures
Response Option and International Law, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 697, 698, 705 (2014) (“Preoccupation with
cyber armed attacks is counter-experiential. Few, if any, cyber operations have crossed the armed attack
threshold,” though there may be cyber operations that “violate the principle of non-intervention, and
accordingly qualify as internationally wrongful acts.”).
36
See generally Ido Kilovaty, The Elephant in The Room: Coercion, 113 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND
87 (2019).
37
Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Cyber!, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1109, 1122 (2017).
38
See Ellen Nakashima, Why the Sony Hack Drew an Unprecedented U.S. Response Against North
Korea, WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/why-thesony-hack-drew-an-unprecedented-us-response-against-north-korea/2015/01/14/679185d4-9a63-11e496cc-e858eba91ced_story.html.
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International law is largely a system of law that applies in the relationship
between states. If state A breaches computer networks belonging to state B, then
state A may be responsible for a violation of international law. However, as
reciprocal security vulnerability illustrates, such isolated incidents are rare, and
usually many more actors than the two immediate states are involved. For
example, state A may attack state B’s servers, but such an attack may also
influence corporations using government databases, individuals whose private
data got compromised, and civilians who may experience fear and anxiety
because of a foreign cyberattack.
The concept of reciprocal security vulnerability brings these private entities
and individuals into the equation, meaning that a body of law that isolates only
two state actors from the rest is ignoring the bigger picture, in which non-state
actors, typically individuals and private-sector entities, are the ones victimized
by foreign state-sponsored cyberattacks. Therefore, to the extent that private
sector entities or individuals are involved, international law is largely irrelevant.
The exception to that is international human rights law, which obligates states
to respect, protect, and ensure certain duties vis-à-vis individuals, which will be
discussed further in Part II. International human rights law may prove effective
in considering this bigger picture.
Second, international law currently does little to tell states how to promote
their cybersecurity and privacy of their citizens. While international law protects
the vital interests of states, such as sovereignty and territorial integrity, it does
little to guide states in how private information ought to be protected, or what
the state’s role is in promoting the information security of its private sector and
citizens. According to international law, the degree to which a state invests in its
information security, or that of the private sector, is wholly under that state’s
discretion.
Third, many of international law’s norms and principles assume
territoriality. While information technology (IT) infrastructure is indeed located
on physical territory, there are certain scenarios in which the reliance on
territoriality may make international law irrelevant and ineffective. Consider
cloud computing, where servers storing data may be located anywhere in the
world. If state A uses cloud computing services to store certain data, and the
servers are located abroad, the focus on territoriality would be beside the point.39
This scenario is far from hypothetical. The United States v. Microsoft
(Microsoft-Ireland) case in the U.S. Supreme Court revolved around a Stored
Communications Act warrant, requiring that Microsoft disclose data stored on a
server in Ireland.40 This has eventually led to Congress passing the Clarifying
Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act (CLOUD Act),41 which purported to create a
system by which U.S. law enforcement could access data stored abroad by

39
Sharon Bradford Franklin, The Microsoft-Ireland Case: A Supreme Court Preface to the
Congressional Debate, LAWFARE (Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/microsoft-ireland-casesupreme-court-preface-congressional-debate (“In our interconnected world, the electronic data that we
create may be stored far away from us, without regard for national boundaries. If our data become relevant
to legitimate law enforcement investigations, the borderless nature of digital data can create obstacles for
government investigators and the tech companies who receive government requests for their customers’
electronic data.”).
40
See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018) (per curiam).
41
CLOUD Act, S. 2383, H.R. 4943, 115th Cong. (2018).
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electronic communication service and remote computing service providers.42
The CLOUD Act has also authorized the U.S. government to enter into executive
agreements between the U.S. government and “trusted foreign partners”43 to
allow these partners to access important digital evidence related to serious crime
committed abroad. The Microsoft-Ireland case demonstrates that governments
are themselves struggling in applying territorial mechanisms on issues that are
extraterritorial by nature.
International human rights law can alleviate these three challenges.
International human rights law protects primarily individuals, rather than states,
it may offer guidance through more specific (though imperfect) obligations, and
the rights can be applied personally rather than territorially, through a robust
doctrine of extraterritoriality.
II. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND TRANSBORDER CYBERATTACKS
Before World War II, international law had largely regulated interactions
between states.44 The aftermath of World War II was a pivotal moment for
international law, when as many as sixteen multilateral human rights treaties
were concluded, ensuring that states could no longer “act within their own
borders with absolute impunity.”45 Therefore, whenever states engage in certain
interactions with or affecting their own citizens,46 they are likely to be bound by
certain human rights obligations deriving from either treaties or customary
international law. Indeed, most treaties contain provisions limiting their
“geographical or jurisdictional reach,”47 which could apply in certain
extraterritorial scenarios.
Article 2(1) of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) reads: “[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect
and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction
the rights recognized in the present Covenant.”48 While the plain meaning of
“within its territory” and “subject to its jurisdiction” may appear conjunctive at
first, the practice that had crystalized around this scope of application reflects a

42

U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PROMOTING PUBLIC SAFETY, PRIVACY, AND THE RULE OF LAW AROUND THE
WORLD: THE PURPOSE AND IMPACT OF THE CLOUD ACT 16 (Apr. 2019).
43
Id. at 2.
44
Frans Viljoen, International Human Rights Law: A Short History, 46 UN CHRONICLE (Jan. 2009)
(“For many centuries, there was no international human rights law regime in place. In fact, international
law supported and colluded in many of the worst human rights atrocities.”).
45
Hathaway, supra note 11, at 389.
46
See John Humphrey, The International Law of Human Rights in the Middle Twentieth Century, in
THE PRESENT STATE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OTHER ESSAYS WRITTEN IN HONOUR OF THE
CENTENARY CELEBRATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION (1973) (“Human rights were—
and indeed still are—essentially a relationship between the State and individuals—usually its own
citizens—residing in its territory . . . considered to fall within domestic jurisdiction and hence beyond the
reach of international law, the norms of which governed the relations of States only.”).
47
Ashley Deeks, Does the ICCPR Establish an Extraterritorial Right to Privacy?, LAWFARE (Nov.
14, 2013), https://www.lawfareblog.com/does-iccpr-establish-extraterritorial-right-privacy.
48
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2(1), opened for signature Dec. 19, 1996,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
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disjunctive approach.49 Therefore, the obligations enumerated in the ICCPR
refer to individuals either within a territory of a state party or subject to its
jurisdiction.
This disjunctive interpretation allows for some form of extraterritoriality in
very limited circumstances.50 For example, the Human Rights Committee
(HRC), in a comment reflective of customary international law, stated that “a
State party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to
anyone within the power or effective control of that State Party, even if not
situated within the territory of the State Party.”51 This standard has been guiding
certain international institutions over the years, and was later applied in a Human
Rights Council resolution on remote drone strikes.52 No longer could counter
terrorism measures be unconstrained by any law, and states engaged in these
operations have become bound by “international law, including the Charter of
the United Nations, international human rights law and international
humanitarian law.”53
Adopting the HRC extraterritoriality standard of “within the power of
effective control,” the Tallinn Manual clarifies that certain human rights apply
“beyond a State’s territory” in cases where that state “exercises ‘power and
effective control.’”54 According to the Tallinn Manual, this control may be “over
territory (spatial model) or over individuals (personal model).”55 This approach,
when applied to cyberspace, ignores a different kind of power that states may
exert over individuals online. Indeed, the Tallinn Manual International Group of
Experts have acknowledged this loophole in the law on extraterritoriality which
disregards new forms of control online.56 It notes that “the International Group
of Experts could achieve no consensus as to whether State measures that do not
involve an exercise of physical control may qualify as ‘power or effective
control.’”57 Mainly, such lack of consensus has to do with the lack of state
practice and opinio juris on the question, suggesting that there may be room for
a legal evolution on the topic in the future.58
While this kind of extraterritoriality may seem desirable to keep state action
abroad in check, this issue remains highly contested in the U.S., as American
officials have historically rejected an extraterritorial application of human rights

49
See Gabor Rona & Lauren Aarons, State Responsibility to Respect, Protect and Fulfill Human
Rights Obligations in Cyberspace, 8 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 503, 507 (2016) (“Increasingly, the terms
‘within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction’ are being interpreted in their disjunctive, rather than
conjunctive sense, at least as concerns the State’s negative obligation to refrain from violating rights.
Thus, the State is bound by international human rights law in relation to individuals outside of its territory
but otherwise under its jurisdiction.”).
50
See Deeks, supra note 47 at 1 (“Many other states, as well as the ICCPR treaty body, assert that
the ICCPR applies either when a person is within the territory of a state party or is subject to a state’s
jurisdiction (as when a state detains a non-national abroad).”).
51
The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, Rep. of the
Human Rights Comm. on its Eightieth Session, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13, at 4 (May 26, 2004).
52
G.A. Res. 25/3, Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and
cultural rights, including the right to development (Mar. 24, 2014).
53
Id. at 1.
54
TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 22, at 184.
55
Id. (internal citations omitted).
56
Id. at 185.
57
Id.
58
Id.
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treaties.59 In an infamous legal memo, then State Department Legal Adviser,
Harold Koh, rejected the interpretation that the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights imposes positive obligations extraterritorially.60 According
to Koh, protecting “persons under the primary jurisdiction of another sovereign
otherwise could produce conflicting legal authorities,” and therefore, the ICCPR
ought to only impose extraterritorial obligations in “exceptional circumstances”
where there is “effective control over a particular person or context without
regard to territory.”61 In comparison, positive obligations (to ensure human
rights) which require affirmatively protecting individuals, should only apply to
individuals “both within the territory and subject to the jurisdiction” of the state
involved.62 While Koh’s memo was ultimately not adopted by the
administration, it did influence the official U.S. position on the matter.63
The contentions on extraterritoriality, while recent, predate the majority of
cybersecurity incidents affecting national security. At present, state-sponsored
cyberattacks may affect the rights of individuals without the attacking state
exerting any effective control or jurisdiction over these individuals, simply
because new technologies can seriously interfere with the enjoyment of rights.
At its conception, international human rights law could not envision that states
would become capable of interfering with and violating protected human rights
enumerated in various treaties and customary international law. Therefore, the
same international human rights law does not offer a robust understanding of
extraterritoriality in light of transborder cybersecurity threats and power
relations online. It may therefore be useful to conceptualize international human
rights law as a regulating force for transborder cyberattacks.
A. REGULATING ACROSS BORDERS
International human rights law already protects individuals from their own
government’s overreach. Nationals of State A may already enjoy their rights visà-vis the government of State A. Examples relevant to cybersecurity are the

59
See Charlie Savage, U.S. Seems Unlikely to Accept That Rights Treaty Applies to Its Actions
Abroad¸ N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/07/world/us-seems-unlikely-toaccept-that-rights-treaty-applies-to-its-actions-abroad.html?_r=0.
60
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OFF. OF THE LEGAL ADVISER, MEMO. OPINION ON THE GEOGRAPHIC
SCOPE OF THE INT’L COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POL. RTS. 55-56 (Oct. 19, 2010).
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Ohlin, supra note 18, at 1587.
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rights to privacy,64 freedom of expression,65 freedom of opinion,66 due process,67
and self-determination.68 State A could run afoul of its international obligations
if it were to surveil its nationals, interfere with their freedom of expression, or
violate their right to self-determination. While some derogations are permitted
in “time[s] of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation”69 the
general expectation is that state parties comply with their treaty obligations most
of the time.
Furthermore, even if a robust extraterritoriality model for cyberspace and
other new technologies is widely adopted, this would not necessarily expose
states to automatic liability for alleged human rights violations abroad. Human
rights, like any other duties and rights, are not absolute. Extraterritoriality will
simply mean that states will be required to offer substantial justification for their
actions within the accepted exceptions contained in human rights treaties, which
involve questions such as “is the interference prescribed by law; does it serve a
legitimate aim; is it proportionate to that aim.”70

64
See Ryan Goodman, The Koh Memo’s Impact on the Current US Position (A Reply, in Part, to Ben
Wittes), JUST SECURITY (Mar. 11, 2014), https://www.justsecurity.org/8124/koh-memos-impact-currentposition-a-reply-part-ben-wittes/ (“Agree with the Koh Memorandum or not, it appears to have already
altered the position that the United States has taken toward its reporting obligations under the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Indeed, if you are a reader who flatly opposes the
Memo’s legal conclusions that the ICCPR imposes extraterritorial obligations, you would not be welladvised by anyone who tells you that the Memo has been “ignored” or doesn’t actually “represent the
considered view of the Legal Adviser’s office.”).
65
See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 19); (Dec. 10, 1948);
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19(2), Dec. 19, 1996, T.S. No. 14668 (adopted
by the General Assembly of the United Nations); European Convention on Human Rights art. 10(1), June
1, 2010, 14 C.E.T.S. 194; American Convention on Human Rights art. 13(1), Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R.,
Report (2011). See also TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 22, at 182 (“At the time international human rights
law norms emerged it was recognised, for example, that the right to freedom of expression (Rule 35)
extended to ‘any’ media, a reference that accommodates technological advancements, such as the
emergence of cyber-enabled expression.”).
66
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 19 (Dec. 10, 1948); International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19(1), Dec. 19, 1996, T.S. No. 14668 (adopted by the General
Assembly of the United Nations); Association of Southeast Asian Nations Human Rights Declaration art.
22 (Nov. 19, 2012).
67
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights arts. 9–11 (Dec. 10, 1948); G.A.
Res. 2200 (XXI) A, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 9–11, 14–15 (Mar. 23,
1976).
68
G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 1(2)
(Jan. 3, 1976) (“All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”).
69
G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 4(1) (Mar. 23,
1976) (alteration in the original).
70
Marko Milanovic, Foreign Surveillance and Human Rights, Part 4: Do Human Rights Treaties
Apply to Extraterritorial Interferences with Privacy?, EJIL: TALK! (Nov. 28, 2013), http://www.ejiltalk.
org/foreign-surveillance-and-human-rights-part-4-do-human-rights-treaties-apply-to-extraterritorialinterferences-with-privacy/; See also Rona & Aarons, supra note 14, at 524–5 (“Any restriction on human
rights in cyberspace must be ‘provided’ or ‘prescribed by law’ which meets ‘certain minimum qualitative
requirements of clarity, accessibility, and predictability.’ No interference can take place except in cases
envisaged by the law and relevant legislation must specify in detail the precise circumstances in which
such interferences may be permitted. Limitations or restrictions on human rights may only be lawful if
they serve a legitimate purpose, which includes protection of the rights or reputations of others; national
security, public order, public health or morals. Where restrictions are justified, any interference must be
limited to what is necessary and proportionate to achieve a legitimate aim or objective. Restrictions must
be applied narrowly to avoid a legitimate objective being used as a pretext for an illegitimate restriction
on human rights.”) (internal citations omitted).
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The concept of states owing certain duties toward their own nationals is
straightforward. But extraterritoriality is taking these duties a step further – what
if State A decides to interfere through cyberspace with the right to privacy
belonging to nationals of State B located in the territory of State B?71 Under that
scenario, international law will have little to say as State B itself is not a target
of the attack and international law offers no guidance on how the nationals of
State B ought to be protected. Moreover, whatever international law offers may
be contentious when applied to a situation where the attack targets a cloud server
located in State C. The complexity of facts and contexts surrounding transborder
cyber operations may actually lead to too many legal questions that are not
necessarily easily resolved.72 Moreover, new technologies create a disconnect
between the geographical location of interference and the geographical location
of the individual whose rights may have been violated.73
Surely, states can enter bilateral or multilateral agreements on the rules of
conduct and sanctions for engaging in harmful cyber operations, whether in the
form of a binding treaty or an informal agreement.74 Such treaties may be
desirable insofar as they protect the interests of individuals. But in the absence
of such treaties, and considering the informality and incompleteness of existing
agreements,75 international human rights law may offer a baseline of what
boundaries exist in the conduct of transnational cyber operations.
While the role of international human rights law in protecting humans
cannot be overstated, the same body of law may also protect other private sector
actors, such as corporations and organizations. Indirectly, international human
rights law may protect these private sector entities by framing the violation as
implicating the human rights of individuals affiliated with the targeted entity or

71
See Ohlin, supra note 18, at 1586 (A good example of this is Russia attacking the DNC, exfiltrating
e-mails belonging to DNC officials. Under the narrow territoriality interpretation, Russia would owe no
obligation to respect and ensure the human rights to privacy of U.S. citizens. However, extraterritoriality
may require that states abide by their obligation to respect and ensure the right to privacy of foreigners,
under certain circumstances.).
72
TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 22 at 593 (“The involvement of multiple states, including a number
of states from whose territory the operation might have originated, the routing states, and several victim
states raises difficult questions of allocating state responsibility, addressing conflict of laws (relating to
criminal and civil liability), and applying the laws governing the use of force (e.g., whether one should
evaluate cumulatively the scale and effect of the harm caused to different states in order to reach the
threshold of harm giving rise to self-defense.”) (internal citations omitted).
73
See Carly Nyst, Interference-Based Jurisdiction Over Violations of the Right to Privacy, EJIL:
TALK! (Nov. 21, 2013), https://www.ejiltalk.org/interference-based-jurisdiction-over-violations-of-theright-to-privacy/ (“In the particular case of the right to privacy, many violations are not due to extraterritorial acts, but jurisdictional acts with extra-territorial effects. That is, where interference with
communications physically occurs in a particular state—the United Kingdom, for example—it can have
extra-territorial effects upon those across the globe.”).
74
See OFF. OF THE PRESS SEC’Y, FACT SHEET: PRESIDENT XI JINPING'S STATE VISIT TO THE UNITED
STATES (Sept. 25, 2015) (“The United States and China agree that timely responses should be provided
to requests for information and assistance concerning malicious cyber activities.”) (demonstrating the
U.S. and China had agreed to cooperate on the reduction of malicious cyber activities).
75
See Kaelyn Lowmaster, The US-China Cyber Agreement Matters, But It’s Not Enough, THE HILL
(Oct. 18, 2017), https://thehill.com/opinion/cybersecurity/356009-the-us-china-cyber-agreement-stillmatters-but-its-not-enough (“[T]his agreement won't prevent all hacks or espionage originating from
China. It targets a very specific subset of intrusions—state-sponsored, targeting intellectual property,
motivated by private sector benefit—and ignores other cyber issues that have since come to the fore (like
cyberattacks on critical infrastructure or election tampering, for example).”) (Noting that such agreements
can do more, but currently leave many loopholes).
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beneficiaries thereof.76 While Sony as a corporation has little to no inherent
human rights, the individuals working and affected by the Sony breach may
nonetheless have a potential claim that their rights have been violated by a state
actor.77
B. THE DUTY TO SECURE & DUE DILIGENCE
In contrast to general international law offering no guidance on how to
secure information technology systems from foreign attackers, international
human rights law provides a more proactive approach. For example, the ICCPR
requires that state parties “respect and … ensure … the rights recognized in the
present Covenant.”78 Similarly, the European Convention on Human Rights
imposes the duty on state parties to “secure to everyone within their jurisdiction
the rights and freedoms . . . .”79 This duty has become known as the “duty to
secure”80 or the “responsibility to protect.”81 Under international human rights
law, states are required not only to refrain from interfering with these rights, but
also to take steps to affirmatively protect them from third-party interference.
These positive obligations have been reinforced by the Human Rights
Committee in its general comments, requiring that state parties not only protect
individuals from violations by state agents, but also against violations by
“private persons and entities.”82 Under such interpretation, a state party may be
liable for a violation of human rights even if its agents are not the ones
committing the violating act,83 if insufficient measures were enacted to ensure
the enjoyment of rights.84 This obligation to ensure enjoyment of rights is further
supported by the due diligence principle, by which states are expected to

76
TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 22, at 188 (For example, the freedom of expression may be
implicated when “…the websites targeted are those of bloggers, journalists, or other individuals that
disseminate information embarrassing to the State or to powerful individuals therein. . . .”).
77
Id. at 183 (“[I]f a hostile cyber operation is directed against the website of a human rights
organisation, the customary law human rights potentially implicated are those of the organisation’s
members, not the organisation itself.”).
78
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2(1), adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171.
79
European Convention on Human Rights art. 1, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, Europ.T.S. No.
5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
80
Yuval Shany, Cyberspace: The Final Frontier of Extra-Territoriality in Human Rights Law (lecture
delivered in ESIL Annual Conference, Naples, Sept. 2017), https://csrcl.huji.ac.il/people/ cyberspacefinal-frontier-extra-territoriality-human-rights-law.
81
INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESP. TO PROTECT (2001).
82
Human Rights Council G.C. 31, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. (“The positive obligations on
State Parties to ensure Covenant rights will only be fully discharged if individuals are protected by the
State, not just against violations of Covenant rights by its agents, but also against acts committed by
private persons or entities that would impair the enjoyment of Covenant rights in so far as they are
amenable to application between private persons or entities. There may be circumstances in which a
failure to ensure Covenant rights as required by article 2 would give rise to violations by State Parties of
those rights, as a result of State Parties permitting or failing to take appropriate measures or to exercise
due diligence to prevent, punish, investigate or redress the harm caused by such acts by private persons
or entities.”).
83
See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 22, at 182 (“[I]f the activities of a non-State actor or another
State interfere with the ability of individuals to engage in cyber activities protected by international human
rights law, States may shoulder an obligation to ensure that the individuals entitled to benefit from the
rights in question can do so.”).
84
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undertake feasible and proportionate measures85 to secure protected human
rights.86
C. BEYOND TERRITORIALITY
International human rights law is capable of overcoming territorial
constraints that often characterize general international law. As human rights are
often personal, meaning they are attached to natural persons, territoriality plays
no significant role.87 Therefore, international human rights law is the right fit for
a domain whose effects easily cross borders and are capable of violating
fundamental human rights.88 States would no longer be able to claim that no state
territory was impacted by their operations, since the effects of these operations
would be felt by individuals whose rights will certainly be implicated.
Moving beyond territoriality may be a desirable approach for the regulation
of global cybersecurity, since the focus would shift from what territory or state
is affected (though, not completely abandoned) to what individuals and rights
are affected by an operation in cyberspace. Understandably, territoriality is a
burden when translated to the cyberspace domain, as the internet may exist in
multiple jurisdictions, with data flowing through multiple geographical points.89
It exists “both everywhere and nowhere.”90
That cyberspace undermines physical territoriality is not a novel assertion.
David Johnson and David Post have previously argued that the rise of
cyberspace is erasing the legitimacy of geographical-based regulation.91
According to Johnson and Post, cyberspace “radically subverts the system of
rule-making based on borders between physical spaces.”92 More recently,
Jennifer Daskal referred to territoriality doctrine “in a world of highly mobile,
intermingled, and divisible data” as “fiction.”93 International law’s territorial
foundation can therefore no longer offer an effective deterrence and remedies
for violations occurring in and through cyberspace.

85
See Human Rights Council G.C. 31, supra note 82, ¶ 7 (requiring that states adopt “legislative,
judicial, administrative, educative and other appropriate measures in order to fulfill their legal
obligations”).
86
Human Rights Council G.C. 36, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/GC/36 (“States parties are thus under a due
diligence obligation to undertake reasonable positive measures, which do not impose on them impossible
or disproportionate burdens, in response to foreseeable threats to life originating from private persons and
entities, whose conduct is not attributable to the State.”).
87
See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 22, at 183.
88
See David R. Johnson & David G. Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48
STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1370–71 (1996) (“Cyberspace has no territorially based boundaries, because the cost
and speed of message transmission on the Net is almost entirely independent of physical location.
Messages can be transmitted from one physical location to any other location without degradation, decay,
or substantial delay, and without any physical cues or barriers that might otherwise keep certain
geographically remote places and people separate from one another.”).
89
Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L. J. 326 (2015).
90
JOHN PERRY BARLOW, A DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE OF CYBERSPACE (1996) (where Barlow
famously said “[o]urs is a world that is both everywhere and nowhere, but it is not where bodies live”).
91
Johnson & Post, supra note 88, at 1370 (“The rise of the global computer network is destroying
the link between geographical location and: (1) the power of local governments to assert control over
online behavior; (2) the effects of online behavior on individuals or things; (3) the legitimacy of a local
sovereign’s effort to regulate global phenomena; and (4) the ability of physical location to give notice of
which sets of rules apply.”) (emphasis added).
92
Id.
93
Daskal, supra note 89, at 331.

50

NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L.

vol. 10:1

III. CHALLENGES AHEAD
Conceptualizing international human rights law as a body of
extraterritoriality obligations may seem outlandish for some states, the U.S.
included. After all, the U.S. has resisted any interpretation of international
human rights law that imposes significant obligations vis-à-vis individuals
located abroad.94 However, the same objection does not hold in an era where
states are increasingly engaged in cyber operations affecting the rights of
individuals abroad. States may therefore become more inclined to accept human
right’s extraterritoriality, considering that their own citizens are at risk of
becoming victims of foreign state-sponsored cyber operations.
Even if human right’s extraterritoriality gains universal acceptance and
adherence, the content of the rights themselves may be unsettled and ambiguous
at times, particularly when applied to cyberspace, a domain that defies
territoriality, physicality, and nationality. What does the right to privacy mean
in an era of ubiquitous state and corporate surveillance?95 What are the precise
contours of the right to self-determination in the wake of election hacking?96
Further, what sort of protections from foreign interference does international
human rights law afford to online speech?97
A. TOWARDS POST-TERRITORIALITY
The assertion that human rights law applies to a certain extended
extraterritorially has been widely accepted throughout the international
community. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), for example,
unanimously held that the United Kingdom had violated the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
when it failed to initiate an investigation into the deaths of five Iraqi civilians
who were killed in 2003, while British forces were engaged in an operation in
Basrah City.98 The ECtHR held that when a state party “exercises effective
control of an area outside that national territory” it has “the obligation to secure,
in such an area, the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention.”99
The effective control standard has indeed gained the widest acceptance
among the nations.100 However, in cyberspace, states engaging in cyber

94

See Goodman, supra note 64.
See Ashley Deeks, An International Legal Framework for Surveillance, 55 VA. J. INT’L L. 291
(2015) (proposing a framework consisting of six norms to address growing domestic and extraterritorial
surveillance).
96
See Michael Schmitt, “Virtual” Disenfranchisement: Cyber Election Meddling in the Grey Zones
of International Law, 19 CHI. J. INT’L L. 30, 55 (2018).
97
See generally Molly Land, Toward an International Law of the Internet, 54 HARV. INT’L L. J. 393
(2013).
98
Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{“itemid”:[“001-105606”]}; see also Wells Bennet, The Extraterritorial
Effect of Human Rights: the ECHR’s Al-Skeini Decision, LAWFARE (July 12, 2011), https://www.
lawfareblog.com/extraterritorial-effect-human-rights-echrs-al-skeini-decision [hereinafter Al-Skeini].
99
Al-Skeini, supra note 98.
100
See Hathaway, supra note 11, at 2 (“All but one of the jurisdictions we examine here has
articulated a test for the extraterritorial application of human rights treaties that turns on the government’s
‘effective control’ over the territory, person, or situation in question.”).
95
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operations across borders usually lack effective control over foreign territory
where the targets are residing, and therefore using the same standard of
extraterritoriality would be irrelevant. Because of its ineffectiveness, it is likely
that many states would feel empowered by the unrestrained legal landscape and
proceed to operate in cyberspace with near impunity.
What is needed, therefore, is an extraterritoriality standard for cyberspace
that takes into account the negative effects experienced by victimized
individuals. While the effective control standard looks at whether a state controls
territory where violations have allegedly occurred, the standard for cyberspace
should equally look at whether the state has control not over territory, but over
the enjoyment of rights and the effects that individuals may experience should
that state decide to carry out a cyber operation.
In other words, international human rights law’s extraterritoriality in
cyberspace is really post-territoriality. No more should international human
rights law ask whether a territory is under effective control of a foreign
government, but rather whether a foreign government controls the ability of
certain individuals or communities to enjoy their rights—be it the right to
privacy, freedom of expression, freedom of opinion, due process, or selfdetermination. This approach would look at technological capacity and power,
not at whether a state is in fact occupying a foreign piece of land.
This dovetails the “personal model” of extraterritoriality, where a state has
physical control of an individual abroad.101 While such a personal model is
imperfect because of the prerequisite of physical control,102 for example, when
a state has “captured, arrested, or detained”103 an individual in a foreign
jurisdiction, the same personal model may be expanded to encompass
technological control—the ability of states to control the enjoyment of rights not
only offline, but also online, and without the use of any physical power.
Moreover, new technologies of communications and data storage simply do not
require the use of such physical power, making the entire analogy between
physical and digital misleading.104
B. THE CONTENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The right to privacy, contained in Article 17(1) of the ICCPR reads: “[n]o
one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy.”105

101
See Eliza Watt, The Role of International Human Rights Law in the Protection of Online Privacy
in the Age of Surveillance, 9th INT’L CONFERENCE ON CYBER 8, 9 (2017) (noting that the personal model
of extraterritoriality occurs when “state agents exercise authority and control extra-territorially . . . State
agent authority is particularly pertinent in military operations where physical authority and control is
exercised in formal detention centres”).
102
Rona & Aarons, supra note 14, at 507, 508 (“As currently defined, the spatial and personal models
of extraterritorial jurisdiction and application of human rights law remain unsatisfying for application to
cyberspace.”).
103
Id. at 508.
104
Milanovic, supra note 70 (“Technological advances in obtaining information have rendered the
exercise of manual, physical power over individuals unnecessary or less necessary. While privacy law in
the information era frequently developed by analogy to old-school physical searches or interferences . . .
there comes a point at which such analogies are no longer feasible or are outright misleading.”).
105
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted Dec. 16, 1966, art. 17
(1), G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (emphasis added).
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But what does such a right to privacy entail when applied to cyberspace? In
1988, when the UN Human Rights Committee adopted its General Comment on
the right to privacy, cyberspace “was in its infancy,”106 and therefore the impact
of new technologies on the right to privacy in the 21st century “was barely
understood.”107
The Snowden revelations have increased the calls to clarify the scope of the
right to privacy in the digital era.108 With increasing state surveillance
“aggressively eavesdropping on millions of communications daily,” some states
have become concerned about Article 17 being outdated. That coalition of states,
led by Germany, have proposed to update the right to privacy, pushing for a
“globally applicable standards for data protection and the protection of privacy
in accordance with the rule of law.”109
The fear that the right to privacy is outdated, and therefore irrelevant for the
digital era is understandable. Many of the human rights that are relevant to
cyberspace have been enacted before most of the current information and
communications technologies were in existence. The scope of these rights in the
context of cyberspace was therefore never debated by the state parties involved.
While it was anticipated that the same human rights would “extend to all media,
regardless of new technological advancements,”110 as of today, there is no
universally accepted definition or understanding of privacy in the digital era.111
Similarly, there are no universal definitions or understandings for the
freedom of expression, freedom of opinion, due process, and selfdetermination.112 These ambiguities may undermine any idea of
extraterritoriality for human rights violations in or through cyberspace. To be
able to hold a violator to account, the scope of the relevant rights will need to be
fleshed out through relevant state practice and the guidance of the Human Rights
Council and UN General Assembly. The view held by the United States, that
“development of norms for state conduct in cyberspace does not require a
reinvention of customary international law,”113 is therefore inaccurate.
C. A HUMAN RIGHT TO CYBERSECURITY?
The human rights currently recognized and relevant to cyberspace, namely
the right to privacy, freedom of expression, freedom of opinion, due process,
and self-determination, are not in themselves sufficient to address the threats
posted by transnational cyber operations. If a state were to attack individual A
abroad, without actually accessing any of that individual’s personal data, what
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human rights would be implicated in such a case? The answer is that there may
not be a specific right violated in this scenario. Therefore, a challenge that may
arise even under a robust extraterritoriality regime is the existence of a specific
right protecting an individual from state-sponsored cyber operations.
There are many ways in which cyber operations may affect individuals
without implicating any existing human rights. For example, a cyber operation
may target personal data belonging to an individual, but instead of viewing it,
result in deletion or manipulation of that data.114 Distributed Denial-of-Service
(DDoS) may also curtail access to the internet and other valuable resources by
overwhelming the target with traffic to the point of collapse.
While the right to privacy may seemingly be implicated in many of the
cybersecurity incidents of recent years, this is not the case for cyber operations
that are not seeking private information. The literature’s focus on the right to
privacy in the context of cybersecurity may be explained by the phenomenon of
“privacy conflation.”115 Privacy conflation refers to the tendency to put
cybersecurity in the same legal category as privacy.116 While privacy is focused
on protecting communications and deidentifying personal information,
cybersecurity relates to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability (“the CIA
triad”) of computer systems and networks.117 Currently, the interest reflected by
the CIA triad is not fully protected by existing human rights, reinforcing the need
for a specific human right to cybersecurity. For example, it is unclear whether a
state interfering or manipulating encryption is in violation of the right to
privacy.118
Aware of some of these threats, the United Nations Human Rights Council
Special Rapporteur for freedom of expression has in the past urged governments
to avoid cutting off access to the internet and to restore such access whenever it
was cut off.119 In other words, recognizing the importance of availability of the
information and communication technologies. Along the same line, a Special
Rapporteur report submitted to the Human Rights Council in 2011 notes that the
internet is “acting as a catalyst for individuals to exercise their right to freedom
of opinion and expression”120 and that “the Internet also facilitates the realization
of a range of other human rights.”121 It took the Human Rights Council five years
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to pass a non-binding resolution reaffirming that “the same rights that people
have offline must also be protected online,”122 a resolution that some have
framed as a recognition of basic internet access as a human right.123
Yet, the actions undertaken to recognize the human rights aspects of internet
access do not fully capture the threat landscape and victimization of individuals
in cyberspace. They are primarily addressed at states curtailing internet access
to their own citizens. However, in two short paragraphs, the Special Rapporteur
did recognize that state-sponsored cyberattacks, including DDoS attacks, may
similarly violate the “obligation to respect the right to freedom of opinion and
expression.”124 Yet, there was no mention of extraterritoriality or a human right
to cybersecurity as a basis shielding individuals from state-sponsored
cyberattacks. After all, if a cyberattack causes disruption that does not affect the
freedom of expression of opinion, would it nonetheless be in violation of human
rights obligations?
This illustrates a gap that may need resolution by the international
community. In the absence of a robust human right to cybersecurity, a state may
devise such carefully tailored cyber operations that seemingly do not violate any
existing human right. Some calls have been made to strengthen cybersecurity
globally, for example, by making “encryption of private communications” a
standard.125 While a welcomed effort, much more is needed to secure
information technology systems from foreign cyber operations.
Once the need for international legal safeguards for cybersecurity is
realized, it may lead to three different outcomes. First, state practice may evolve
in a manner that “infuses” existing human rights with a cybersecurity flavor. In
other words, an interpretive approach to existing law. Second, states may decide
to enter bilateral or multilateral agreements that set out the rules and principles
governing trans-border state-sponsored activities in cyberspace. Such an
approach would most likely focus on the rights and duties of states, rather than
individuals. Third, states may realize that an amendment to existing international
human rights law is required, and that a human right to cybersecurity should be
added on top of the existing human rights in various treaties and customary
international law.
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CONCLUSION
New technologies of information and communications challenge basic
premises of existing international law, particularly because of the growing
involvement and victimization of private actors, such as individuals and
corporations. International human rights law may address some of the concerns
overlooked by general international law, predominately through its focus on
protecting individuals and private-sector entities from state-sponsored cyber
operations. This Article is mindful of the fact that much more needs to be done
to effectuate the full potential of international human rights law in containing
the negative effects of foreign cyber operations. States and international
institutions would have to further develop the doctrine of extraterritoriality in
cyberspace, which ought to be supported by a more nuanced human right to
cybersecurity distinguishable from the existing right to privacy and other
relevant human rights.

